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Thesis: One question looms in the wake of genocide. Which road to reconciliation? In this
thesis, I examine the concept of reconciliation in both a theoretical and applied manner. By
exploring three modem cases of genocide and the reconciliatory methods used in each, I have
reached the following conclusion: Though gacaca (pronounced ga-CHA-cha), an informal,
traditional, tribal form of justice and truth telling, is not a perfect solution to the problems
presented by genocidal conflicts, its concept of blending retributive measures and restorative
practices can provide a stable platform to promote reconciliation in future post genocidal cases.

TheNewWar

In the Leviathan, Hobbes said that life is "nasty, brutish, and short." And the rising
instances of human rights abuses occurring at the dawn of the twentieth century have proven him
correct. In 1914, The Young Turk government of the Ottoman Empire sought to expel the
Armenian population from its borders. As a result, Turkish forces rounded up an estimated one
and a half million Armenians and purged them from their borders, during which time
approximately 500,000 Armenian men, women, and children died either as a result of starvation
during their forced exile or by the hands of Turkish soldiers. But perhaps the most egregious
instance of human suffering in the twentieth century occurred during World War II, when
Hitler's Nazi regime murdered six million Jews in an attempt to exterminate the entire Jewish
population.
Yet Howard Ball states, "War crimes and genocide are not new twentieth century
realities. . . . The world has for centuries experienced war, war crimes, and brutality that have
violated the 'conscience' of humanity" (11). Throughout human history, there have been scores
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ofbrutal conflicts. From 431-404 B.C., Greece was in a constant state of war as Athens and
Sparta fought against one another for supremacy during the Peloponnesian War, and the major
world powers of the twentieth century engaged in a pair of World Wars which left millions dead
throughout the battlefields of Europe.
But even though war crimes and genocide are not inventions of the twentieth century,
they have become more commonplace in modern conflicts. The chivalrous notion of combat as
state versus state or soldier versus soldier has given way to a new form of intrastate warfare
targeted against civilian populations, resulting in unspeakable human rights abuses. Since the
end of World War II, "there have been at least fifteen major genocides" in which 15 million
civilians have been killed (Ball 218-19). And this increase of civilian aimed violence has
recently come to be known as the "New War."
Conventional "old wars" generally occur between two or more international actors for the
purpose of securing or maintaining sovereignty, with the "rules of war" being defined and
mutually agreed upon so that combat is limited to military targets in an effort to limit the loss of
civilian lives. For example, the Geneva Convention and subsequent international treaties signed
by the major world powers during the "Hague Era" outlined "the conduct of war- the treatment
of prisoners, the sick and wounded, and non-combatants ... and the definition of weapons and
tactics that do not conform to this concept" (Kaldor 24).
New war, however, is intrinsically different. "Until the twentieth century, wars were
'conflicts over political power rather than ideology'" or class identity (Ball 11). The new war
focus on the utilization of identity politics -a claim to power "on the basis of labels" like
religion or ethnicity - in contrast to the geo-political or ideological goals" of old wars (Kaldor 6).
Battles are not fought between opposing nation states; rather, the fighting is internalized between
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opposing groups within the state. Categorically, these conflicts are essentially civil wars;
however, their primary aim is different from that of conventional civil wars. Achieving political
control is no longer the end, but rather a means to facilitate the extermination of a different group
or class of society. That is to say, that new war conflicts rely on the seizure of power to facilitate
the annihilation of a minority group within the state.
As used in the new war, group identity is exclusive rather than inclusive. In the case of
Rwanda for example, the national identity splintered into an ethnic conflict between the Hutu
and Tutsi tribes. Rwanda's President, Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, was losing popularity in
Rwanda due to attacks from the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), a small rebel group ofTutsi
refugees based in Uganda. Seeking someway to secure his power, Habyarimana devised a
campaign that linked the Tutsis to the RPF. As a result, tensions between the two tribes
increased and eventually escalated into a genocidal conflict in which over 800,000 Rwandans,
mostly Tutsis, were killed. This type of exclusivism drives a wedge between the populations by
creating an "us versus them" attitude that directs violence against the civilian populations
associated with the groups. Kaldor notes that
the new warfare borrows from counterinsurgency techniques of destabilization
aimed at sowing 'fear and hatred' . The aim is to control the population by getting
rid of everyone of a different identity (and indeed of different opinion). Hence the
strategic goal of these wars is population expulsion through various means such as
mass killing, forcible resettlement, as well as a range of political, psychological
and economic techniques of intimidation. . . . At the turn of the century, the ratio
of military to civilian casualties in war was 8: 1. Today, this has been almost
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exactly reversed; in the wars of the 1990's the ratio of military to civilian
casualties is approximately 1:8. (8)
These genocides present a difficult task for the international community. The biggest
problem, however, is not how to end the bloodshed, for all wars reach an eventual end through
one means or another. But the major dilemma is preventing the hostilities from flaring up again,
because these genocidal conflicts tear apart the social fabric of the communities in which they
occur. What is to be done with those who are responsible for the genocide? And what justice is
there for the victims? Scholars and laymen alike have tried to answer these questions, but which
road is the right one to follow? Are there multiple paths that lead to the answer? Or for that
matter, is there any answer at all?

Truth, Justice, & the Reconciliatory Ways: an Introduction

One question that looms in the wake of genocide is how to achieve reconciliation, but
what exactly does the word "reconciliation" mean in the context of present day reconciliation_
theory? It seems an easy enough term to describe, yet there is abundant deliberation amongst
scholars as to what it entails. Often in post genocidal discussions, reconciliation is partnered
with words like truth, justice, and mercy, and lately, the pairing of reconciliation and religion has
"gained widespread currency in political discourse" (Little 69). Therefore, before discussing the
different methods of reconciliation, it is necessary to identify and defme its essential
components.
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Truth

Truth, the evaluation and public dissemination of information pertaining to crimes
committed during warfare, is vitally important in the reconciliation process because it produces a
factual account of events, as well as a therapeutic means of understanding. Truth gives victims
the opportunity to know what happened to them, but most importantly, it aids in understanding
why things happened. If truth is concealed from victims, the reconciliatory process is

unachievable, and "conflict will never be resolved" (Lederach 28). If there is no truth, then there
is no accountability; without accountability, there is no justice; and without justice, there can be
no reconciliation.

Justice

Justice is an attempt to compensate the victims of a crime - in this case, civilians whose
human rights have been violated through abuses by their own government and/or fellow
countrymen- by holding offenders accountable for their actions. Justice therefore "represents
the search for individual and group rights, for social restructuring, and for restitution" (Lederach
29). Without justice there is no resolution, and victims are forced to stomach yet another
distasteful helping of injustice. The need for justice is as equally important to the reconciliation
process as the need for truth, because without justice and accountability, "the brokenness
continues and festers" (Lederach 28). Modern theorists agree that justice is a vital step in
achieving reconciliation, but a debate exists among modern reconciliation theorists over the
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question of how to achieve justice for victims while balancing the demand for "individual
accountability" with "social harmony" (Little 65).

Reconciliation

When intertwined with religion, reconciliation becomes synonymous with forgiveness,
implying that the victims and violators can only reach a resolution through discussion of the
crimes committed, repentance of wrongdoings, and an act of mercy by the victim. But is
reconciliation the "end-state toward which practices of apology and forgiveness aim? Is it a
process of which apology and forgiveness are merely parts? Or is it something altogether
independent of apology and forgiveness" (Dwyer 81 )? Some would argue that forgiveness is
totally irrelevant to the process of reconciliation. Instead, some form of punishment for
offenders is necessary to provide a sense of justice to reconcile the animosity within society.
This division between punishment and forgiveness has led to the formation of two prominent
schools of thought for achieving justice, and ultimately reconciliation, which have come to be
known as restorative and retributive justice.

Accountability: The Debate between Punishment & Forgiveness

According to the PFI Centre for Justice and Reconciliation 's online resources, restorative
justice can be described as a "systematic response to wrongdoing that emphasizes healing the
wounds of victims, offenders, and communities caused or revealed by criminal behavior." In
one restorative model proposed by David Little, the offender is given the opportunity to confess
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the crimes he has committed. His act of remorse is intended to alleviate the resentment within
the community; and as a result, the community becomes apt to forgive the offender on the basis
ofhis remorse, thus leading to a state of harmony. Additionally, John Paul Lederach of the
United States Institute of Peace describes his vision of restorative justice as the following:
First, in overall sense, reconciliation promotes an encounter between the open
expression of the painful past, on the one hand, and the search for the articulation
of a long-term interdependent future, on the other hand. Second, reconciliation
provides a place for truth and mercy to meet, where concerns for exposing what
has happened and for letting go in favor of new relationship are validated and
embraced. Third, reconciliation recognizes the need to give time and place to both
justice and peace, where redressing the wrong is held together with the
envisioning of a common, connected future. (31)

In each account, "healing and restoration would be out of the question" without the
relationship of remorse and forgiveness (Lederach 28). Proponents argue that "restorative justice
defines crime interpersonally and focuses on future reconciliation and the restoration of relations
between victim and perpetrator, and with the society at large" (Little 66). Hence, seeking a
peaceful alternatives like reforming criminals should be the principal focus in order to deter
future violence, not "imposing penalties for individual wrongdoing as an end in itself' (Little
68).
The emphasis in Retributive Justice, on the other hand, is to hold offenders accountable
through legal means of punishment in an attempt to compensate victims for the sufferings they
have endured. As Howard Ball states, "Justice for victims of genocide .. . is achieved when the
alleged war criminal is in the dock, or preferably, dead (224). Punishment as a means of
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accountability is an essential component of retributive justice because it "reasserts the rule of law
over those who have abused power and engaged in serious rights violations" (Popkin, Bhuta
1o1). Apology and forgiveness may still exist during the process; but in retributive justice,
"reconciliation and forgiveness are conceptually independent, even if they often go together"
(Dwyer 90).
Detractors claim that retributive justice prolongs animosity within the community by
promoting an atmosphere in which individuals are singularly focused on revenge and settling
past scores rather than encouraging social harmony; and if left unchecked without the "benefit of
impartial adjudication," the cycle of violence would continue (Little 69). But proponents assert
that this is not the case because the punishment would be "determined and administered
according to judicial rules and procedures" by an external arbiter like and international tribunal
(Little 66). By prosecuting offenders, "collective guilt is avoided" and placed solely upon the
guilty offender; the victims' suffering is acknowledged; and an "accurate historical record of the
nature of and responsibility for the crimes committed" is constructed (Ball 224).
Theories like these have provided the international community with an arsenal of peace.
Retributive measures like criminal tribunals have been used to prosecute war crimes in Bosnia;
Latin American nations like Chile have instituted "blanket amnesties" for all human right
violators; and African traditional methods of justice like gacaca, a combination of truth
commission, public forum, and judiciary, have been used in conjunction with international
criminal tribunals in Rwanda. But have any of these methods helped to alleviate the suffering?
This is a difficult question to answer, for how can anyone determine with any certainty whether
or not reconciliation has occurred? Genocidal conflicts affect an immeasurable number of
victims, making it impossible to quantify results on a person-by-person basis.
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Reconciliation in Practice: The Cases of Chile, Rwanda, & Bosnia

The most plausible way to try and answer this question is to use case studies to compare
the different methods applied in post genocidal societies of similar nature and use qualitative
analysis to reach a subjective conclusion. In the following sections, the first two cases of Chile
and Bosnia explore the use of amnesty and criminal tribunals. While the final case of Rwanda
suggests that neither of the individual methods presented in the first two cases are practical by
themselves. Rather, the restorative practice of amnesty in conjunction with the retributive
application of criminal tribunals can provide a reasonable means of reconciliation that satisfies
the requirements of truth and justice while providing an atmosphere where forgiveness, and
ultimately reconciliation, can be achieved.

Chile

On September 11, 1973, a coup d'etat led by Augusto Pinochet overthrew the
democratically elected government headed by Salvador Allende, a member of the socialist
Unidad Popular party. As a result, Pinochet seized power and replaced the former democratic
system with a military dictatorship which lasted for 17 years until Chile' s formal return to
democracy in 1990. During those 17 years, Pinochet's military junta set out to eliminate the
remnants of the oppositional socialist party in an effort to maintain control of Chile's
government. Former Allende government officials, their supporters, and even their family
members were subjected to a brutal nightmare of both civil injustice and human rights abuses.
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The primary objective ofPinochet's new regime was to remove all remnants of the
previous government. Shortly after September 11, 1973, Pinochet's new administration issued
decrees that former members of the ousted Unidad Popular government cede their positions, and
in some cases report to their local police stations where they were to submit to arrest.
Throughout the country, the vast majority of remaining officials proceeded to relinquish their
positions "without any problem" and in a "formal fashion" (Report 1: 130). As a result, the
newly instituted junta in Santiago "unified political, administrative, and military power in
themselves and parceled out the national territory among the different branches of service,"
giving the military and police force unbridled authority to maintain order throughout the nation
(Report 1: 130). With this new found power, the newly created military controlled junta set its
sights on removing any and all opposition to its authority.
Those officials who either submitted to arrest or relinquished their positions were
rounded up and sent to detention centers located within the newly created military districts.
Initially, political prisoners were "relocated to army bases, police stations, jails, and the garrisons
of the investigative police" where they were temporarily held and interrogated before being sent
off to one of the larger "detention sites" (Report 1: 132). Before and during their interrogations,
prisoners were subjected to beatings and humiliation. In most cases, arrests were made publicly
so the detainees' families and neighbors were witness to the event, producing a sense of
embarrassment for the prisoner. In some cases, possibly dependent upon the former political
position held by the individual, the humiliation of the public arrest would be coupled with
beatings in order to send a message to the members of the community who still might be
sympathetic to the former Unidad government (Report 1: 133). The public shame, however,
would prove to be a minor inconvenience compared to the brutal fate which most political
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officials and sympathizers eventually encountered after their transfer to one of the larger prison
camps set up throughout the country.
The largest and most infamous of these camps was located at National Stadium in
Santiago, which held up to as many as 7,000 prisoners according to estimates from the Chile
Information Project ("Derechos Humanos en Chile"). For those unfortunate enough to be held at
one of the large camps, torture, fear, and death were everyday occurrences. Prisoners were
denied food and water for days, immobilized for extended periods, beaten, raped, "held under
water, foul smelling substances, or excrement to the brink of suffocation," or shocked by
electrodes during interrogations (Report 1: 133). CIA intelligence reports compiled during
Pinochet's tenure described disposed corpses from camps as "showing signs of torture and
mutilation" ("CIA Activities in Chile"). The mother of prisoner Euginia Ruiz-Tagle, saw the
body of her son and described its condition saying, "An eye was missing, the nose had been
ripped off, the one ear visible was pulled away at the bottom, there were very deep bum marks as
though done by a soldering iron on his neck and face, his mouth was all swollen up, there were
cigarette bums, and judging from the angle of the head, his neck was broken, there were lots of
cuts and bleeding" (Report 1: 140). This type of violence, however, was not limited to the walls
of the prison camps.
The Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation cites
hundreds of instances of Chilean citizens being murdered outside of the prison camps. One such
instance occmred on September 13, 1973 when 15 year old Juan Fernando Vasquesz Riveros
was killed during a police raid. The Report compiled the following account of the incident:
At about 5:30pm, before the curfew in Santiago (which began at 6:00pm), [Juan
Fernando Vasquesz Riveros ] was walking by in the street just as a police squad
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was raiding the union office at the Ferriloza company. Without even giving any
orders to halt, police proceeded to shoot at him. In a wounded condition he was
taken to the Jose Joaquin Agueirre Hospital, where he died on September 15 as a
result of an "abdominal bullet wound" (1: 170).
Additionally, thousands of sympathizers disappeared without a trace during Pinochet's
dictatorship, "never to be seen alive again" (Ball 219). The disappearances, which became so
commonplace that they gave rise to the phrase los desaparecidos (the vanished), occurred at the
prison camps as well as villages and towns throughout Chile.
These disappearances caused an immeasurable amount of grief for the victims' families
because the truth about what happened to their loved ones was deliberately concealed from them.
Arrests were denied by government officials; visitation was refused; deaths were concealed; and
wealthier families were extorted into depositing money into government accounts, yet their loved
ones were not released (Report 1: 143). As a further act of cruelty, some officials told inquiring
relatives that their loved ones were "alive and free on bail" when in reality they had been
executed and buried days earlier (Report 1: 142). But the final injustice happened in 1978 when
the Pinochet controlled government instituted Decree Law No. 2191 which granted amnesty "to
those who had committed criminal actions while the state of siege was in effect," thus shielding
offenders from future prosecution of human rights violations (Report 1: 89). Since its enactment,
there have been numerous attempts to repeal the law; but for the most part, the "blanket
amnesty" has created a cycle of impunity that has hindered the search for justice in Chile.
In 1990 Pinochet stepped down and "handed over power to the democratically elected
government of President Patricio Aylwin" ("Discreet Path"). During the power transfer, the new
government attempted to deal with past human right violations by establishing the Rettig
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commission to investigate cases of disappearances and torture (Popkin, Bhuta 112). In most
cases, the commission was successful in its attempt to "document the fate" of victims; but
unfortunately, the commission did little to "reveal the truth" about those responsible for the
violence because the amnesty law prevented the Rettig and other independent truth commissions
from fully investigating all the details of human rights abuses (Popkin, Bhuta 114). As a result,
"the mourning period" has never ended for some families because the truth has been concealed
and the guilty have escaped justice (Report 2: 790).
In Chile, reconciliation has been stalled for the past two decades because truth,

accountability, and justice have been undermined at the highest levels of government. Vital
information which might implicate former officials has been deliberately concealed, making it
virtually impossible to hold anyone accountable for any crimes committed during Pinochet's
tenure. Attempts have been made to prosecute human rights violators, but the most prevalent
action taken by the Chilean courts has been to "impose forgetting" by dismissing charges against
human rights violators (Popkin, Bhuta 99). In nearly every case brought before it, the Chilean
Supreme Court has continued to uphold the amnesty law, and "successive democratic
governments have been unwilling to annul [it]" because of the possible disturbances ensuing
trials might pose to national stability (Popkin, Bhuta 114). The international community,
however, has recently tried to break this cycle by indicting Pinochet on charges of human rights
violations.
In 1998, General Pinochet was preparing to return to Chile from a trip to London; but

shortly before his departure, he was indicted for human rights abuses committed during his
tenure as president and faced extradition to Spain. The indictment came as a result of lawyers
and NGOs (non-governmental organizations) acting on behalf of victims in Chile; but
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specifically, the hearings were initiated on the grounds that Spanish citizens had been murdered
during in Chile during Pinochet's leadership ("Baltasar Garzon"). Using the principle of
"universal jurisdiction," Judge Baltasar Garzon demanded that Pinochet be arrested and
transported to Spain "pursuant to the European Convention on Extradition" (Bianchi 98). At
first, the British Court of Appeal rejected the extradition request citing that Pinochet's status as
head of state "entitled him to immunity under the State Immunity Act of 1978" (Popkin, Bhuta
113). Spain appealed the verdict to the House of Lords which "reversed the lower court's ruling
by a 3-2 decision," stating that "a former head of state is not entitled to immunity for such acts as
torture, hostage taking, and crimes against humanity committed while he was in office" (Bianchi
100). But Pinochet escaped prosecution in 2002 when the Chilean Supreme Court ruled he was
"too ill to undergo trial" ("Chile: Pinochet Escapes Justice"). However, Sebastian Brett of The
Observer recently reported that the Chilean appeals court unexpectedly revoked Pinochet's
immunity from prosecution in June of2004. As of the time of this writing the court's rationale
has not be disclosed, but the decision shows that the need for truth and justice in Chile still
exists. For now at least, the door to justice is open, for the revocation ofPinochet's amnesty may
also lead to the prosecution of other human rights violators. But with Pinochet's appeal on the
horizon and the Chilean Supreme Court's penchant for upholding the amnesty decree, the door
may once again be slammed shut.
Irregardless of how the Pinochet case unfolds, the fact remains that the blanket amnesty
has only hindered the reconciliation process in Chile. Granted, it was instituted in by former
government officials under the guise of protecting themselves from prosecution as well as
concealing the truth about their crimes; but even if a blanket amnesty was instituted by and
impartial entity and the truth fully exposed, the fact remains that this type of amnesty completely

removes all accountability. So how can there be any reconciliation for victims if their torturers
are allowed to walk free as if nothing ever happened? I would argue that there cannot be,
because blanket amnesties subvert the "human need for justice" (Little 65). And amnesty
without any means of legal recourse "moves on too quickly" and asks too much of victims
(Lederach 28). It cuts off all avenues to justice and forces victims to accept what has happened,
and then move on with their lives as if nothing ever did happen. And that is the problem,
because crimes of rape, torture, and murder do not just disappear with a decree or the stroke of a
pen. The pain lingers and psychological wounds fester. And if these injuries are not addressed
and dignity is not fully restored, victims are "unlikely to be reintegrated into society" (Popkin,
Bhuta 101 ). Therefore, another means of reconciliation which aims to provide justice for victims
should be explored.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Due to the complex nature of the Balkan Wars and the nature of this study, it would not
be feasible to narrate the entire circumstances of each individual war. As such, the following
section will focus solely on the Serbian campaign in Bosnia where the majority of ~thnic
cleansing occurred. However, it should be stated that Bosnians, Croats, and paramilitary groups
like the Mujahidin committed and have been indicted for human rights abuses as well.
After the death of its Communist Party leader, Tito, in 1980, the collapse of the
Communist system in 1989, and the subsequent secession of Slovenia and Croatia, the nation of
Yugoslavia fractured into a series of smaller, independent republics -the largest being the
republic of Serbia. This series of events, coupled with an ailing economy created an unstable,
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"revolving door" for politicians. Desperate to preserve or expand what power they had,
politicians were forced "to curry public support to stay in office" (Hauss 166). For a majority of
them, the most effective way to do this was to rely on nationalistic rhetoric. With public opinion
and morale fluctuating, doctrines of ethnic and religious superiority proved to be a more
effective means of dealing with the socio-economic problems burgeoning inside the newly
formed territories, rather than dealing with the issues directly. As Hitler had done in Germany,
Croatian, Serbian, and Bosnian leaders embraced nationalism, using race and religion as their
scapegoat from political death.
Slobodan Milosevic was one politician who greatly excelled at this practice. He began
his political career as a member of the Communist Party, and "by the mid-1980's had quietly
risen to the top of the party hierarchy in Serbia" (Hauss 166). Shortly after becoming the
president of the Serbian party in 1987, Milosevic visited the town ofKosovo Polje in the
autonomous region ofKosovo in which Albanians comprised the majority of the population.
According to Dr. Veljko Vujacic, while Milosevic was speaking to a group of Serbians who had
gathered to "communicate their grievances," police officers, a majority of whom were ethnic
Albanians, attempted to disperse the crowd by beating them with batons (Vujacic). Witnessing
this, Milosevic proclaimed, "From now on, no one has the right to beat you!" which immensely
elevated his standing among the Serbian population (Vujacic).
Over the course of the next few years, Milosevic continued his nationalistic campaign in
an attempt to "take control of [Yugoslavia] and become the next Tito" (Hauss 166). But with the
dissolution of Yugoslavia, Milosevic grasped for control of Serbia instead. Upon his
confirmation as President, Milosevic continued his policy of nationalism in attempt to unite the
Serbian populations scattered throughout the former Yugoslavia and gain greater territorial
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control. In a disturbingly brilliant fashion, Milosevic engineered a series of media campaigns
aimed at portraying the Serbs as victims of past aggressions. As Mary Kaldor states
It was Milosevic who was the first to make extensive use of the electronic media

to propagate the nationalist message. . . . Through mass rallies he legitimized his
hold on power. The victim mentality often characteristic of majorities who feel
themselves minorities was nurtured with an electronic diet of tales of 'genocide'
in Kosovo, first by the Turks in 1389 and more recently by the Albanians, and of
the holocaust in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina interspersed with current
developments. In effect, the Serbian public experienced a virtual war long before
the real war was to take place- a virtual war that made it difficult to distinguish
truth from fiction so that was became a continuum in which the 1389 battle of
Kosovo, the Second World War and the war in Bosnia were all part of the same
phenomenon. (39-40)
With his campaign a success, Milosevic took full advantage of the political instability lingering
throughout the republics, and he was able to motivate the minority Serb populations in the
neighboring republics to organize on behalf of Serbia proper. What followed was a series of
bloody territorial wars between Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia which redefined the nature of "ethnic
cleansing."
One of the primary goals of the Serb campaign in Bosnia was to "establish ethnically
homogenous territories which would eventually become part of Serbia" (Kaldor 33). To do this,
the Serbian government instituted a policy of ethnic cleansing to remove all traces of the Bosnia
Muslims. Bosnian men, women, and children were either killed en masse in their homes and
villages by Bosnian-Serb paramilitary squads or detained in prison camps, where they were
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subjected to numerous forms of physical and mental torture. But the genocide committed against
the Muslims was not carried out in the impersonal, efficient manner like the Nazi death camps.
Rather, the violence in Bosnia was meted out with a sadistic flair. The Serbian military' s (JNA)
Department of Psychological Operations devised a plan to crush the Muslims ' morale, desire for
battle, and will by "raping women, especially minors and even children, and killing members of
the Muslim nationality inside their religious facilities" (Kaldor 56). And when this plan went
into action, it gave the Bosnian-Serb forces license to carry out all manner of degrading and
perverse torture.
"Muslims had been buried alive;" children were killed in front of their parents; and in one
particularly disturbing case, it was documented that a man had been "forced to eat the liver" of
his murdered grandchild (Ball 129). Additionally, thousands ofMuslim men and boys were
summarily rounded up and executed, with the largest number of casualties occurring in the UN
created "safe haven" of Srebrenica where Serbian forces murdered an estimated 7,000 Bosnians
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("Bosnian Serbs admit to Srebrenica"). Reports from UN peacekeeping forces described the
Serb forces a being "proud" of crimes they committed; and as one Dutch peacekeeper stated, "I
didn' t get the feeling that they were doing it out of anger of revenge, more for fun" (Ball 136).
But as heinous and psychologically damaging as the mass slaughter of Bosnian Muslims
was, the use of rape as a means of ethnic cleansing has become the hallmark of the Serbian
campaign. So much so, that its methodical and rampant use in Bosnia led to the establishment of
rape as a crime against humanity. And during the Serbian campaign, Caroline Kennedy-Pipe
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notes that rape was used in the following five ways:
In the first, the rapes were committed before the fighting actually broke out.
Individuals would target villages, terrorize the inhabitants and loot and rape.
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During the second pattern, rapes, some apparently opportunistic, occurred in
conjunction with invasion. Women were raped either in empty houses or gangraped in public. In a third pattern, women were raped while in detention: here
gang rapes were common and many of the rapes were accompanied by torture.
During the fourth pattern, attacks occurred in so called ' rape camps'. This pattern
was marked by frequent rapes with an alleged strategy by the captors to
impregnate as many as possible with 'Chetnik' babies. In a fifth pattern, women
were forced into makeshift 'brothels' to entertain troops and 'after they had
served their purpose more often killed than released.' (73)
The sexual horrors Bosnian women were forced to endure have been documented in numerous
UN reports. In 1995, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
released the following report on the Bosnian situation:
Methods of rape, i.e. technologies, are such that they are probably
unprecedented in history. Serb soldiers raped women and girls in their homes in
front of the families and husbands. In some cases, women and children were
gathered in special premises (schools, sports centres and the like) where they were
raped and tortured for days or weeks, and killed afterwards. Rapes were
committed both by individuals and by groups. Many women testified that they
had been raped by several men, who took turns.

II
I
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Rapes were accompanied by different additional forms of psychological torture:
victims were regularly forced to swallow sperm, some of the victims were raped
by many criminals (some of them over 300 times), criminal violence frequently
took place in the presence of the family members of the victim, victims were

killed after rape, while most of the raped girls of seven years of age (who were
always raped in the presence of their parents) passed away afterwards.
In light of the human rights abuses that occurred, the UN Security Council adopted
resolution 827 in 1993 which created International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
to investigate and prosecute "serious violations of international humanitarian law" in the former
Yugoslavia. Shortly thereafter in 1995, representatives from Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia signed
the Dayton Agreement, which formally ended the Balkan conflict at which time the ICTY began
issuing its indictments.
According to the ICTY's official website, nearly 80 indictments - the most recent of
which came in May of2004- have been served since the war's end against high-ranking military
and government officials like Slobodan Milosevic and Ratko Mladic to common soldiers like
Mirjan Kupreskic. To date, over 30 cases have been completed with sentences ranging from
three years to life imprisonment. However, a number of key trials like Milosevic's are still
underway or pending appeal. But despite its apparent effectiveness in bringing war criminals to
justice, the use of the ICTY has met with skepticism from many Yugoslavs.
The tribunal's main objective has been to prosecute individuals in order to "ensure that
there is no Serbian or Croatian or any other collective guilt;" yet as Tim Judah notes, many
Yugoslavs are still very skeptical of the process ("The Fog of Justice"). According to Dr.
Thomas Smith, one of the main reasons for concern has been the lack of indictments against
NATO for the bombing campaigns in Serbia which killed approximately 500 civilians (Smith,
"Re: Draft Revision"). Though the ICTY did examine the cases, the Prosecutor ultimately did
not initiate indictments on the grounds that civilians were not the intended targets. Rather, their
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deaths were ruled to be accidental, which "suggest[ed] a certain amount of 'politics' almost
inevitably" among Yugoslavs (Smith, "Re: Draft Revision").
Moreover, many of the indicted were considered ' homeland heroes' at war's end,
meaning when indictments were announced, the corresponding population complained that they
were being unfairly persecuted (even though the tribunal has indicted Bosnians, Serbs, and
Croats). In addition, the polarizing nature of the indictments has been a dangerous affair for
liberal Serb politicians who have cooperated with ICTY investigations. During an apparent coup
to regain control of the government and end cooperation with the ICTY, nationalist supporters
assassinated Premier Zoran Djindjic, claiming he was "a Hague traitor" ("The Fog of Justice").
But the negative social and political impacts are not the only obstacles that international
tribunals face. In cases like Yugoslavia an estimated 20,000 to 50,000 persons have been
suspected of committing human rights abuses, there is no realistic way to investigate, indict, and
prosecute so many individual cases (Wald 1124). Thus, tribunals have not been "generally
concerned with the larger historical picture or with the needs of survivors" as a whole because
they are forced to focus solely on the most prominent cases (Roht-Arriaza 485). They can only
provide a limited amount of justice on a case by case basis; and though they have succeed in
eliciting some measure of truth during the process, the information is by and large related only to
the specific case in question, which may not involve the majority of victims overall. And this
has been one of the major setbacks of tribunals; they attempt to provide truth and justice, but
they are unable to achieve it on a large enough scale.
Despite the skepticism amongst the Yugoslav communities, the ICTY has "filled a
critical void that none of the national courts were prepared or able to fill" in Yugoslavia (Waid

(

1125). It has indicted a number of prominent figures like Milosevic and produced a number of
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convictions, rather than allowing war criminals to live out the rest of their days in "relative
comfort" immune from judgment (Neuffer 390). As a result, the tribunals have helped victims

I

"put a face on evil" (Smith, "Moral Hazard" 178). In a way, international entities like the ICTY

j

take a step in the right direction, but international tribunals by themselves can only do so much to

I

elicit the truth and provide legal accountability. If the reconciliation is to ever be achieved,

I

something more must be done in order to provide truth and justice to a larger number of victims.

Rwanda

The war between the Hutu and Tutsis stems back to Rwanda's colonial period.
Ethnically, the two groups differed with the Hutu being of Bantu origin and the Tutsi being
Nilotic. But culturally, the two tribes were very similar. They spoke the same language and
practiced the same traditional beliefs. But the Belgians viewed the two tribes as distinct entities,
and even went so far as to "produce identity cards classifying people according to their ethnicity"
("Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened"). Of the two tribes, the Belgians regarded the Tutsis
as superior; and as such, Tutsis received greater opportunities for socioeconomic advancement
during Belgian rule.
But in the 1950s, Belgium' s colonial authority began to fade; and as Rwanda' s
independence loomed, political parties emerged, defming themselves "along ethnic lines"
(Neuffer 89). With Belgium's withdrawal from Rwanda in 1962, the Hutus - who constituted a
majority of the population - gained political control from the Tutsis. Once in power, the Hutus
completed the cycle of prejudice by discriminating against their former Tutsi masters. And
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throughout the years leading up to the war in 1994, the Tutsis were "portrayed as the scapegoats
for every crisis" ("Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened").
As noted earlier, In 1994, Rwanda's Hutu president was losing popularity in Rwanda
due to attacks from the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) based in neighboring Uganda. Seeking
someway to secure his power, Habyarimana devised a campaign that linked the Tutsis to the
RPF. Though there had been a clash between the Hutu and Tutsi in 1959 resulting in the death
of 20,000 Tutsis, the subsequent years leading up to 1994 were relative free from violence. But
Habyarimana's ploy had begun tore-intensify the ethnic rivalry between the two tribes; and
when his airplane was shot down in 1994, it set off a brutal massacre in which 800,000 Tutsis
and their moderate Hutu supporters were heinously murdered within the span of 100 days.
It is not clear who exactly shot down the president's plane, but immediately after his

death, accusations mounted that the RPF was responsible. Shortly thereafter, recruits were
dispatched throughout the country to carry out a retaliatory strike against the Tutsis. In less than
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two days, Hutu fighters managed to "dispose of most of the 'priority targets'- the politicians,
journalists, and civil rights activists;" but the killing in Rwanda was not done in a high tech,
efficient manner (Prunier 242-243). Instead, the majority of the killings occurred "largely by
machete", which the Rwandans called a panga (Gourevitch 4). In an excerpt from The Rwanda
Crisis, Gerard Prunier describes the some of the horrors that occurred during the "machete
genocide."
The killings were not in any way clean or surgical. The use of machetes often
resulted in a long and painful agony and many people, when they had some
money, paid their killer to be finished off quickly with a bullet rather than being
slowly hacked to death with a panga. Sexual abuse of women was common and
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they were often brutally killed after being raped. Babies were often smashed
against a rock or thrown alive into pit latrines. Mutilations were common, with
breast and penises being chopped off. In some cases, they became part of macabre
rituals .... At massacre sites, corpses, many of them children, have been
methodically dismembered and the body parts stacked neatly in separate piles ....
In some cases, militiamen tried to force women to kill their children in order to
save their own lives. Some people were burnt alive as their relations were forced
to watch before being killed themselves. In other cases the Interahamwe told
families that if they would kill a certain relation the rest of the family would be
spared. (255-257)
Keith Richburg of the Washington Post said, "It's one of those apocryphal stories you
always hear coming out of Africa, meant to demonstrate the savagery of 'the natives.' You heard
them all, but never really believed" (xiii). Yet it was happening in Rwanda; "people were dying
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at three times the rate of the precision organized Nazi death camps (Gourevitch, 4). But in
Rwanda, the killings were not carried out by the government alone. Ordinary citizens banded
together to form a group which they called the Interahamwe. As Paul Magnarella notes, "Some
women, including young girls in their teens, were participants in the carnage, hacking other
women and children, and sometimes even men, to death (20).
In July, the RPF took control of the capital city of Kigali, causing the Hutu controlled
government to collapse. As a result, nearly 2 million Hutus fled to Zaire. With millions on the
run and the recent arrival ofUN peacekeeping forces, Rwandans set about the task of recovering
from the murderous madness that swept across the nation. As in the former Yugoslavia, the UN
instituted International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to investigate and prosecute individuals
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suspected of human rights abuses. At war's end, over 100,000 suspects had been detained in
Rwanda; but instead of relying solely on the ICTR, Rwandans tried to alleviate the judicial
bottleneck by using a traditional system of justice they called gacaca, which means "on the
grass" (Packer 59).
Procedurally, the gacaca tribunals differed greatly from the ICTR. Village elders and
"people of integrity" were chosen from each community to serve as judges on panels which
consisted of 19 members each (Packer 61). There were no prosecutors or defense counsels, and
the hearings were conducted in an informal manner with defendants, their accusers, and
witnesses personally describing their version of the events. Jurisdiction was divided between the
ICTR and the gacaca tribunals on the basis of four categories. Category 1 cases consisted of the
organizers and supporters of genocide, as well as rapists; Category 2 cases involved murder, but
not leadership of killers; Category 3 cases consisted of crimes that resulted in injury; and
Category 4 cases included offenses against property (Packer 61). Since the tribunals were a
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complement to the ICTR, they only had jurisdiction in Category 2 through 4 offenses. In
Category 1 cases, judgment was deferred to the ICTR; but in all other legal matters, the local
tribunals had total authority.
The idea behind the system was that every Rwandan was affected by the war in some
way; therefore, everyone needed to be involved in the reconciliation process. Gacaca 's purpose
was to bring communities together so every victim could have a chance to publicly testify on
their own behalf to expose the truth of the genocide. Once the facts were established and guilt
was determined, the panels could then impose sentence upon the guilty. But the tribunals were
not strictly retributive in nature; if an offender showed remorse and made a full, public
confession, his sentence could be substantially reduced or possibly commuted to time served
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(Packer 61 ). As a result, the tribunals were able to promote mercy and forgiveness without
sacrificing justice and accountability.
Though gacaca was able to bring communities together and provide truth and justice to
a larger number of victims, many observers are still skeptical about its effectiveness. Detractors
point out the "obvious procedural deficiencies" like the lack of formal counsel and prosecution,
and the fact that the ')udge and jury [are] one and the same" (Packer 62). And critics warn that
gacaca 's de-proceduralized nature has been plagued by "low standards of evidence" based on

hearsay and conjecture. (Packer 62) Granted, gacaca does have its share of problems; but
irregardless of these flaws, the thinking behind gacaca shows promise. It aims to provide truth
and justice to a greater number of victims, while promoting a spirit of mercy and forgiveness. It
offers hope and a reason for all parties involved to participate; and as long as there is hope for all
involved, there is hope for reconciliation.

Conclusion

Though I do believe that reconciliation is possible, I do not think that it will ever be
possible for societies to reconcile in the ideal, restorativist way. Rather, reconciliation should be
thought of from a realistic point of view. In restorative theory the primary emphasis is on
forgiveness, but how can anyone be expected to forgive or forget atrocities like murder, torture,
or rape? They cannot be forgotten, and they will not be forgotten so long as the victims live. It
is one thing to attempt to lessen the divide in society, but it is "quite another to come to love
one's torturer" (Dwyer 97). As such, reconciliation in the most ideal use of the term is
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unattainable. However, forgiveness should not be fully removed from the process altogether; but
it should remain a secondary component of the process.
As I stated earlier, truth and justice should be the primary concerns. If the requirements
of both are met, then the victim is free to exercise their option to "reconcile" on their own
accord. The main concern is that the process be allowed to take place in a natural fashion, so
that the victim can continue to heal in whatever way they choose. Truth can be cathartic, and
should therefore never be impeded. And though it can be argued that truth can act as two-edged
sword by both healing wounds and opening up news ones, I would argue that when paired with
impartial, legal justice, the danger of retaliation can be sufficiently blunted by the judicial
process. Whatever animosity full disclosure might cause, the trial process will alleviate it.
In every war, both old and new, there bas always been a central figure or figures

responsible for orchestrating the violence. As such, they bear the brunt of the blame. Therefore,
whatever harmful knowledge is discovered during the truth process, its effects will be lessened
as a result of the individual accountability created by the trial phase. Through the pursuit of
justice, "collective guilt can be avoided;" the victims' suffering can be acknowledged; and an
"accurate historical record of the nature of and responsibility for the crimes committed" will be
constructed (Ball 224).
But how should the reconciliation process be carried out? I have explored a few of the
options like amnesty and international criminal tribunals in the previous cases; but one problem
with a majority of modem reconciliation theory is the fact that it is too focused on finding one
specific way to achieve reconciliation. I would argue that this approach is flawed because there
is no "perfect" method to achieve reconciliation. Rather, both restorative and retributive
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measures should be used in conjunction with one another to provide a more adequate sense of
truth and justice in order to facilitate the healing process.
No single method will work by itself. As I stated in the Chile section, the blanket
amnesty has done nothing but hinder the reconciliation process in Chile. And in the former
Yugoslavia, the ICTY's attempt at justice has been too inept to be of any use on a large scale.
Some might argue that the lack of truth and justice in these cases has not caused the hostilities to
flare up again, meaning reconciliation must be underway. And yes, some semblance of
reconciliation· may be at work, but it is partial at best. Therefore, the best that can be hoped for is
a continued existence of shallow loathing as opposed to deep-seated hate.
As I said, I am not advocating any single method as being the best. Instead, I am trying
to focus on the positive and negative aspects from each of the methods in the cases I have
examined in order to find a better way. Amnesty by itself offered nothing; the ICTY achieved
some measure of truth and justice on a limited scale; whereas Rwandan gacaca tried to meet
somewhere in between. Of these three cases, Rwanda showed the greatest promise because it
did not rely on only one way of thinking. It employed both restorative and retributive techniques
in an attempt to solve its post genocidal problems. And though gacaca is not a perfect solution,
its concept of blending retributive measures and restorative practices can provide a stable
platform to promote reconciliation in future post-genocidal cases.
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